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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing Mrs. Nielsen's complaint on 
summary judgment where there were material issues of fact in dispute regarding (1) whether the 
adjuster for the insurer of Ms. Heffron (all collectively referred to herein as "Liberty Mutual") 
represented to Mrs. Nielsen or her counsel that the "personal injury" language in the release 
would not be binding on Mrs. Nielsen thereby precluding use of the release due to estoppel or 
fraud in the inducement; and (2) whether an employee or agent of Liberty Mutual physically 
altered the release, making it void and fraudulent. 
Standard of review: Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A 
challenge to summary judgment involves only review of questions of law in which the appellate 
court reviews the questions for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's conclusions. 
The appellate court addresses (1) whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and 
(2) whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact. 
Glencore. Ltd. v. Ince, 343 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 10 (Utah 1998). 
This issue was preserved for review in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s 
Objection to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend Her 
Complaint and attachments thereto, R. 43 to 51, and in oral argument before the trial court, R. 
123, T. 14-23. 
2. The trial court abused its discretion in denying Mrs. Nielsen's motion for leave to 
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amend her complaint where (1) justice clearly required the granting of the motion, (2) there 
would be no prejudice to the defendants, and (3) the issues involved in the proposed amendment 
related directly to the validity of the release. 
Standard of review: A ruling on a motion to amend is within the discretion of the trial 
court. Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Utah 1993). Where the trial court exercises its 
discretion, it may be reversed only for abuse of that discretion. State v. Harmon. 956 P.2d 262, 
265 (Utah 1998). 
This issue was preserved for review in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s 
Objection to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend Her 
Complaint and attachments thereto, R. 43 to 51. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no determinative constitutional or statutory provisions governing the resolution 
of these issues. Issue No. 2 is governed by Rule 15(a), Utah R. Civ. P. which provides that leave 
to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a personal injury action by Vickie M. Nielsen which arose as a result of an 
automobile accident on September 28, 1990. Negotiations with Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company, the Defendant's insurer, began in February of 1991. On May 1, 1991, Liberty Mutual 
paid Mrs. Nielsen's husband for loss of his pickup truck in exchange for title to the vehicle. On 
or about June 6, 1991, David Gehris, adjuster for Liberty Mutual, negotiated a settlement for 
Mrs. Nielsen's separate property damage claim. He sent a release to be executed by Mrs. Nielsen 
and her counsel. Mr. Gehris advised Mrs. Nielsen's attorney that he knew the settlement was 
only with respect to Mrs. Nielsen's property damage claim and that they could ignore language 
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in the release regarding personal injury claims. Not wishing to rely solely on Mr. Gehris' oral 
representation, Mrs. Nielsen's counsel crossed out on the release the words "Personal Injuries 
existing or which may exist which are known or unknown to me at the present time" and "both to 
person." Both then executed the release. 
On December 15, 1992, Mrs. Nielsen's counsel contacted Mr. Gehris concerning Mrs. 
Nielsen's back injury resulting from the accident and discussed her pending surgery. On August 
24, 1993, Mrs. Nielsen's counsel again contracted Mr. Gehris regarding the expenses for the 
surgery. On September 21, 1993, Mrs. Nielsen's attorney received a letter from Mr. Gehris 
requesting that he be contacted regarding the personal injury claim. On October 5, 1993 Mrs. 
Nielsen's counsel sent a medical records package to Mr. Gehris and requested that he respond 
concerning an independent medical examination. Litigation was timely commenced on 
September 20, 1994. 
Mrs. Nielsen's counsel subsequently corresponded with Liberty Mutual personnel 
regarding the personal injury claim and both parties engaged in discovery. Not until Liberty 
Mutual filed its motion to dismiss on or about October 28, 1997, three years after 
commencement of the action, did Liberty Mutual produce the release and assert that the release 
precluded Mrs. Nielsen's personal injury claims. 
Liberty Mutual submitted with its motion an affidavit of Mr. Gehris. Mrs. Nielsen 
responded with documentary evidence, her own affidavit and an affidavit of her attorney.1 She 
also filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint to allege fraud and alteration of the release. 
The trial court ruled that the Best Evidence Rule governed the issue and interpreted the 
lrThe motion is, therefore, properly treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 
56, Utah R. Civ. P. See Rule 12(b), Utah R. Civ. P. 
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release without resort to extrinsic evidence. It ordered Mrs. Nielsen's claims dismissed with 
prejudice. Without entertaining oral argument on Mrs. Nielsen's motion for leave to amend and 
without making any findings as to that motion, the trial court denied her motion. 
This appeal has been brought to challenge the trial court's dismissal of Mrs. Nielsen's 
claims and its denial of her motion to amend. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On September 23, 1990, Vickie Nielsen was injured in a traffic accident involving a 
vehicle operated by Mary Jane Hefferon. R. 2. 
2. Subsequent to the accident, Mrs. Nielsen obtained counsel who negotiated a 
settlement with Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, insurer of the vehicle operated by Mary 
Jane Hefferon. R. 44. 
3. In May of 1991, Liberty Mutual settled the claim of Mrs. Nielsen's husband for loss of 
his pickup truck. R. 44. 
4. Subsequent to the May 1991 settlement, Mrs. Nielsen negotiated and settled her 
separate claim for property damage. R. 45. 
5. Liberty Mutual's claims adjuster, David Gehris, sent Mrs. Nielsen a release form to 
execute prior to receipt of the property damage amount. The adjuster represented to Mrs. 
Nielsen's counsel that the settlement was solely for the property damage and that Mrs. Nielsen 
could "ignore" the language regarding personal injury. R. 45. 
6. Mrs. Nielsen did not trust the insurance company or Mr. Gehris. As a result, her 
counsel crossed out the words "Personal injuries existing or which may exist which are known or 
unknown to me at the present time" and "both to person." R. 45. 
7. Mrs. Nielsen executed the release agreement with the personal injury language struck 
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out. R. 45. 
8. Both Mrs. Nielsen and Mr. Gehris understood that Mrs. Nielsen would be asserting a 
claim for personal injuries after she underwent the necessary extensive medical treatment. R. 46. 
9. From December 1992 through September of 1994, Mrs. Nielsen's counsel contacted 
and corresponded with Mr. Gehris concerning Mrs. Nielsen's personal injury claims. R. 46 to 
47. 
10. Mrs. Nielsen commenced this action on September 20, 1994. R. 1. 
11. After commencement of the action, Mrs. Nielsen cooperated with Liberty Mutual in 
the evaluation of her personal injury claims. R. 46 to 47. 
12. Both parties engaged in extensive discovery. At no time during discovery did 
Liberty Mutual produce the release nor assert reliance on the release as an affirmative defense. 
13. In August of 1997, Liberty Mutual "found" the release. R. 34. 
14. On October 28, 1997, Liberty Mutual filed (1) a motion for leave to amend its answer 
to assert the release as an affirmative defense, and (2) a motion to dismiss. R. 38. 
15. On November 13, 1997, Mrs. Nielsen filed an objection to Liberty Mutual's motions 
and a motion for leave to amend her complaint to assert her claims of fraud and bad faith of the 
release and her defenses to the release. R. 40. 
16. With her memoranda, Mrs. Nielsen filed her affidavit and an affidavit of her counsel 
raising material factual issues about the validity and enforceability of the release. R. 52 to 82. 
17. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motions on February 26, 1998. R. 123 
(see transcript). 
18. At the hearing, Mrs. Nielsen's counsel inspected the release and acknowledged the 
validity of the signatures. R. 113. 
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19. The trial court then relied on the best evidence rule to hold that the scope of the 
agreement must be determined from the face of the release. R. 113. Finding no ambiguity in the 
language of the release, the court refused to consider parol evidence and held that the release 
precluded Mrs. Nielsen's claims. R. 114. 
20. At no time did the trial court evaluate Mrs. Nielsen's claims of fraud, alteration, or 
fraud in the inducement. 
21. Without discussion or analysis, the trial court denied Mrs. Nielsen's motion to amend 
her complaint. R. 114. 
22. The trial court dismissed Mrs. Nielsen's claims with prejudice. R. 114. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Factual issues which are material are 
those which affect the final determination of legal issues under the appropriate governing law. In 
the present case, the legal issue is whether the release produced by Liberty Mutual is valid and 
bars Mrs. Nielsen's personal injury claims. 
A release, like any other agreement, is construed according to its terms from the face of 
the agreement except in cases where facts exist which would invalidate the agreement. A release 
which limits or waives liability is unenforceable if procured by fraud or entered into on 
reasonable reliance upon the positive assertions made by another. In addition, a contract which 
has been altered is invalid. Where the question of alteration has been raised, the issue is a fact 
question which must be presented to the trier of fact and may not be disposed of by summary 
judgment. Where a document has been submitted which appears regular on its face, the trial 
court or finder of fact may not presume the document to be valid in the face of an assertion that 
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the document was altered or that the agreement was fraudulently induced. 
Mrs. Nielsen did not allege fraud in her earlier pleadings because there was no indication 
that Liberty Mutual was going to assert the release as a defense to her claims. Only when the 
release was later found and Liberty Mutual asserted it as an affirmative defense, did Mrs. Nielsen 
have to evaluate the fraud issues. She did so timely through her objection to Liberty Mutual's 
motion to dismiss and by motion to the court for leave to amend her complaint. 
The trial court's dismissal in the face of disputed issues of material fact was erroneous as 
a matter of law. In addition, its denial of Mrs. Nielsen's motion to amend was an abuse of 
discretion which resulted in prejudice and substantial injustice to Mrs. Nielsen. This Court 
should, therefore, reverse and remand to the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE THERE WERE 
DISPUTED FACTS AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE 
RELEASE. 
It is well-established law that a trial court may properly grant summary judgment only in 
the absence of genuine issues of material fact where the moving party is entitled to judgment on 
the undisputed facts as a matter of law. E.g., Glencore. Ltd. v. Ince. 343 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 10 
(Utah 1998). This Court has stated in the context of a summary judgment motion that an issue of 
fact "must be material to the applicable rule of law." Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857, 859 
(Utah 1983). It has not defined "materiality" in the summary judgment context. It has, however, 
j 
indicated in a criminal matter that the measure of materiality is the effect of a fact on the 
outcome of a trial. State v. Schreuder. 712 P.2d 264, 275 (Utah 1985) ("Testimony is material. . 
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. if there is a reasonable probability that its presence would affect the outcome of the trial.") The 
U.S. Supreme Court has defined the terms "material" and "genuine" for summary judgment 
purposes. A "material" fact is one "that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing 
law," and a "genuine" issue is one for which "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 248, 
106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Many states have similarly defined a fact as being 
material for summary judgment purposes if it can affect the determination of the legal issues, i.e., 
the outcome of the case.2 
The legal issue before the trial court on summary judgment was whether the release 
signed by Mrs. Nielsen, which contained language releasing liability for personal injury, was 
valid and enforceable. The trial court relied on the "best evidence rule" to the exclusion of parol 
evidence to conclude that the release was valid and enforceable. 
This Court has recognized that parol evidence is properly received where an agreement 
may be invalid for fraud or other causes. 
This court has held that as a principle of contract interpretation, the 
parol evidence rule has only a narrow application. Simply stated, 
the rule operates, in the absence of invalidating causes such as 
fraud or illegality, to exclude evidence of prior or 
contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements 
offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an 
integrated contract. 
Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n. 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted, 
emphasis added). See also State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsev. 565 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1977) 
(presumption that writing is integrated is appropriate "in the absence of invalidating causes such 
2E.g., Beck v. Haines Terminal & Highway Co.. 843 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1992); Peterson v. Halsted. 829 
P.2d 373, 375 (Colo. 1992); Drake v. Drake. 586 P.2d 742, 743 (Okla. 1978); Clements v. Travelers Indem. Co.. 
850 P.2d 1298, 1301 (Wash. 1993); Mize v. North Big Horn Hosp. Dist.. 931 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 1997). 
8 
as fraud or illegality"); Lamb v. Bangart. 525 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah 1974) ("unless fraud, accident 
or mistake be averred, the writing constitutes the agreement between the parties"). 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts addresses the issue of when parol evidence may 
be admissible in the evaluation of a facially complete agreement. 
Agreements and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with the 
adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to establish 
(a) that the writing is not an integrated agreement; 
(b) that the integrated agreement, if any, is completely or 
partially integrated; 
(c) the meaning of the writing, whether or not integrated; 
(d) illegality, fraud, duress, mistake, lack of consideration, 
or other invalidating cause; 
(e) ground for granting or denying rescission, reformation, 
specific performance, or other remedy. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214 (1981). Two of the Restatement comments are relevant 
to the present issue. 
What appears to be a complete and binding integrated agreement 
may be a forgery, a joke, a sham, or an agreement without 
consideration, or it may be voidable for fraud, duress, mistake, or 
the like, or it may be illegal. Such invalidating causes need not and 
commonly do not appear on the face of the writing. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214 comment c. 
A contract which is fully enforceable in an action for damages may 
be subject to equitable remedies such as rescission or reformation 
by reason of fraud, mistake or the like. . . . Evidence of the 
circumstances in which the contract was made may be relevant to 
such remedial issues . . . 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214 comment d. 
Under Utah law, an agreement which limits liability, such as the release at issue here, is 
unenforceable if it is procured by fraud. Otsuka Electronics (USA, Inc.) v. Imaging Specialists, 
Inc.. 937 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Utah App. 1997) (citing Lamb v. Bangart. 525 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 
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1974)). See also Despain v. Despain. 855 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Duean v. 
Jones. 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980), "A person may rely upon positive assertions made by 
another, and fraud in the inducement may allow the injured party to avoid the contract.") 
It is also Utah law that a challenge to the validity of a document based on alteration is a 
fact question which must go to the finder of fact. "[T]he question of [a document's] validity is a 
matter to be determined by the trier of fact, and the mere fact that a judge allows a document to 
be received in evidence does not mean that the jury or the court, if there is no jury, must accept 
the document as genuine." Hartman v. Young. 551 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1976). See also Zions 
First Nat. Bank v. Rocky Mountain Irr.. Inc.. 795 P.2d 658, 663 (Utah 1990) ("The trial court 
should have allowed the jury to decide the material, fraudulent alteration issue.") Parol evidence 
is admissible in evaluating the alteration issue. 
[I]f the genuineness or authenticity of a material expression is in 
question, the parol evidence rule does not come into play; 
otherwise, it would be a means of destroying all defenses of a 
forgery victim and making a false document genuine, simply by 
silencing the person who most clearly knows of its falsity. 
Tates. Inc. v. Salisbury. 795 P.2d 1140, 1141 (Utah App. 1990). The existence of this fact 
question as to the alteration of the release, on which parol evidence is properly admissible, 
clearly precludes summary judgment on the validity of the document. 
After it became apparent that Liberty Mutual intended to rely on its newly located 
release, Mrs. Nielsen discovered that the release did not reflect changes she made at the time she 
signed it, She subsequently filed a motion to amend her complaint to allege fraudulent alteration 
of the release. 
In addition, in response to Liberty Mutual's motion to dismiss, Mrs. Nielsen submitted her 
affidavit and that of her counsel which clearly raise issues of fact material to the validity and 
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enforceability of the release. Mrs. Nielsen's affidavit stated, in part: 
6. Under no condition did I settle my personal injury claim 
in June of 1991 knowing the extent of my injuries. I told my 
attorney that I did not trust insurance companies and I would not 
sign the release unless we modified the document. 
7. When the Release and Settlement agreement was signed 
on June 6, 1991 in my attorney's office, I specifically asked him to 
cross out the words "Personal Injuries existing or which may exist 
which are known or unknown to me at the present time" and "both 
to person." 
8. The agreement that the Defendants have submitted is not 
a true nor a correct copy of the original that was signed by me and 
sent to the insurance company by my attorney. 
Affidavit of Vickie M. Nielsen, R. 53. The affidavit of Mrs. Nielsen's attorney also establishes 
fact questions about the intent of the parties in executing the release and raises questions about 
whether the release had been altered. Affidavit of Paul M. Halliday, Jr. R. 56. 
Mrs. Nielsen raised factual issues about the circumstances surrounding her execution of 
the release which would preclude the written agreement from being an integration or a statement 
j 
of her intent. She also raised factual issues about the facial validity of the release, in particular 
whether it had been altered after she signed it. The trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
reliance on the best evidence rule despite the existence of these material issues of fact was 
erroneous as a matter of law. This Court should, therefore, reverse the summary judgment and 
remand to the trial court for further proceedings. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING MRS. NIELSEN LEAVE TO AMEND HER 
COMPLAINT. 
The decision of whether to grant leave to amend a complaint is within the discretion of 
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the trial court. E.g., Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Utah 1993). Rule 15(a), Utah R. 
Civ. P. provides that "leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires." This 
Court has interpreted this provision liberally to "afford parties 'the privilege of presenting 
whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute.'" Wilcox v. Geneva Rock 
Corp.. 911 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). A denial of a motion to amend is an 
abuse of discretion if it results in prejudice to the moving party. Slattery v. Covev & Co., Inc.. 
857 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted). There are three considerations which the 
appellate court views in evaluating on a trial court's ruling on a motion to amend: "(1) the 
timeliness of the motion; (2) the moving party's reason for the delay; and (3) the resulting 
prejudice to the responding party." Swift Stop. Inc. v. Wight. 845 P.2d 250, 258 (Utah App. 
1992) (citing Westlev v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange. 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983)). A motion to 
amend made well into the discovery process "should be allowed if there is reasonable 
explanation for the delay in discovering the facts and the amendment is not unduly prejudicial to 
the opposing party." Chadwick v. Nielsen. 763 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Girard v. 
Appleby. 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983)). 
Mrs. Nielsen commenced this action on September 20, 1994. The parties engaged in 
extensive discovery. At no time did Liberty Mutual produce the release. In August of 1997, 
Liberty Mutual "found" the release and subsequently filed a motion for leave to amend its 
answer and a motion to dismiss based upon the release (October 28, 1997). Based upon the 
recollection of Mrs. Nielsen and her attorney that the personal injury provisions had been lined 
out, Mrs. Nielsen made her motion to the court on November 13, 1997, for leave to amend her 
complaint to raise the issue of fraudulent alteration of the release. 
At no time prior to the hearing before the trial court on February 26, 1998 was Mrs. 
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VICKIE M. NIELSEN, 
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f'iul No Q4nonsqsop| 
Judge William A. Thorne 
This matter came on for hearing on February 26, 1998 pursuant to the Motion to Dismiss 
filed by Defendant, the Estate of Mary Jane HefFeron, and the Motion to Amend Complaint filed 
by Plaintiff. At (tut In .inn" flriititiflwa1' |iu*sHit anil n,jpnisen1nJ In hinllSI Halliddh hi mil 
and for the law firm of Halliday & Watkins, and Defendant was represented by Lynn S. Davies 
a n d k c i i i l VI l l u i ' . c i i n l L u i i l h n llln l i n IIImn11m uJ K i t l i d i i l i l l i u i u l l l U i J I e r tV INi I s o n . 
Having reviewed the papers and pleadings on file herein, including the motions and 
memoranda filed in support of and in opposition to the present motions, and good cause 
appearing therefore, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. At the hearing held in this matter, Defendant's counsel produced an original 
Release and Settlement of Claim (the "Original Release"). Exhibit "A" attached to Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss appears to the Court to be a duplicate of the 
Original Release. 
2. At that hearing, after having inspected the Original Release and conferred with 
Plaintiff, Plaintiffs counsel acknowledged that the signatures on the Original Release are the 
signatures of Plaintiff and her counsel. 
3. Also at that hearing, Plaintiffs counsel stated that there was only one original of 
the Release and Settlement of Claim. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Under the Best Evidence Rule, set forth at Rules 1002-1004, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, where the Original Release is available and before the Court, Plaintiffs counsel 
having acknowledged that the Original Release bears the signatures of Plaintiff and her counsel, 
the content and scope of the parties' agreement must be determined from the Original Release. 
2. After having considered all of the evidence presented by Plaintiff, the Court finds 
that there is no ambiguity with regard to the language of the Original Release. Accordingly, the 
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parties' intent must be ascertained solely from the language of this contract, without resort to 
parole evidence. 
3. The Original Release clearly encompasses Plaintiff's claims for personal injuries 
arising from the accident that is the subject of this accident, which are the same claims asserted 
in this action. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's claim is dismissed with 
prejudice; and it is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff s Motion to Amend her 
Complaint is denied. 
DATED this 7 - r day of j vv^-L, , 1998. 
BYTHECOURT: 
J u The Honorable Judge ^ i 
Third District Cour t^ 
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Approved as to Form: 
HALLIDAY & WATKINS 
Paul M. Halliday, Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERT1I l< Al l ' HI SK.IU l( I 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this 3r4 day of <HT\dLt,ohs \998, to the 
following: 
Paul M. Halliday, Jr. 
Paul M. Halliday 
HALLIDAY & WATKINS 
376 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
y/LtJ/l^i^ 
8871-363: 188026 
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